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Policymaking has a long and complex history in long-term care, which is one of the most 
highly regulated industries in the United States.  The Final Rule for Reform of Requirements of 
Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities was published with Phase I of III effective 
November 26, 2016. A retrospective program evaluation using data from the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Nursing Home Compare was conducted of 14,210 SNFs/ 
NFs. This study used a quantitative approach to determine the impact of the RoP on four quality 
measures: percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic, long-stay residents 
with moderate to severe pain, long-stay residents who were physically restrained, and short-stay 
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened.  Data was analyzed using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. Significant changes were observed in the 
percentage of each of the four quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the RoP.  
Logistic models indicate the influence of ownership and location on quality measure percentages 
RoP. This study adds to existing literature regarding the impact of regulatory stringency on 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
Policymaking has a long and complex history in long-term care, which is one of the most 
highly regulated industries in the U.S. (Brady, 2001; Eskildsen & Price, 2009; Kumar et al, 
2006). In 2016, the Final Rule for Reform of Requirements of Participation (RoP) for Long-
Term Care Facilities was published with Phase I of III effective November 28, 2016 (Medicare 
& Medicaid Programs, 2016).  The Final Rule was the first overhaul of regulations for long-term 
care facilities since 1991. The cost of implementing the new regulatory requirements, per 
facility, is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000 per year thereafter 
(Medicare & Medicaid Programs, 2016; Unroe, Ouslander & Saliba, 2017).   
There is little research available pertaining to the impact of the 2016 RoP for long-term 
care facilities. There is research, however, demonstrating a lack of evidence to support 
improvements in the quality of care provided by nursing homes due to regulations; therefore, the 
addition of more regulations may not be effective in improving quality of care (Brady, 2001).  As 
stated by Brady (2001), “to the extent that there are problems with the quality of care provided 
by certain nursing homes, those problems do not exist because of a lack of regulation” (p.5).  
Though nursing homes are often referred to as long-term care facilities, most offer short-
term skilled nursing and rehabilitation services in addition to long-term care services. Skilled 
Nursing Facilities (SNFs) are certified to receive Medicare funding for services provided to 
Medicare beneficiaries, often referred to as short-stay patients or residents.  Nursing Facilities 
(NFs) provide long-term care services through Medicaid or personal (private) funds.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contract with each State to 
enforce nursing home regulations (Mukamel et al, 2012).  State Surveyors, employed by Health 




certified SNFs/ NF every 9 to 15 months.  The ‘annual survey’ is an assessment of the facility’s 
compliance with over 150 standards which must be met to continue to receive funding through 
Medicare and/ or Medicaid (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  Additionally, surveyors must investigate 
consumer complaints, sometimes resulting in additional compliance surveys. Deficiencies are 
cited for areas not meeting standard(s) and require a plan of correction be submitted by the 
facility within 10 days.  Scope and severity are assigned for each deficient area and can result in 
civil monetary penalties (CMPs), loss of funding, and/ or mandated changes in leadership. 
According to Winzelberg (2003), the punitive approach to regulation or nursing homes will 
continue to be ineffective in improving quality of care due to the unique service population and 
environment in each home.  Additionally, though the regulations and process are outlined in a 
standardized approach, there is discrepancy amongst different surveyors and states regarding 
how and which homes are cited and at what scope and severity.   
Nursing homes continue to experience significant cuts in Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement (Siegel et al, 2014) and a critical staffing shortage (JCAHO, 2014).  In the State 
of New Hampshire alone, the average daily cost to provide care and services per nursing home 
resident is under-funded by Medicaid by $46.39 (American Health Care Association, 2017).  The 
lack of evidence demonstrating the beneficial effects of increased regulatory scrutiny and high 
costs of compliance in achieving improved quality of care is a difficult sell to providers and 
consumers (Walshe, 2001).   
The purpose of this research project is to gain understanding of the impact of the 2016 
RoP (Phase I) on resident care.  This will enable providers to gain a better understanding of the 
impact of the RoP, the results of their efforts to comply with the regulations and provide 




The demand for nursing home care is expected to increase in the coming decades 
(Eskildsen & Price, 2009). The 65 and over population is expected to increase from 12% in 2005 
to 20% by 2050 (Cohn & Taylor, 2010; Hoffman, 2018).  The annual turnover rate for licensed 
Nursing Home Administrators is estimated at 57% (Siegel, Leo, Young & Castle, 2014), 
primarily attributed to the challenging regulatory environment and shortage of nursing staff 
(AHCA, 2014; Angelilli, Gifford, Shah & Mor, 2001; Castle, N., 2006).  The negative aspects of 
these regulations and requirements on resident choice and quality of life, the burnout and 
turnover of staff, the unsatisfied residents and family members, and the lack of evidence 
supporting improved quality of care is exasperating.  It is important to understand the effects of 
these regulatory changes on the nursing home environment, including patients, residents, 
families, staff, and other stakeholders.  This research seeks to provide a better understanding of 
the process and reasoning behind the changes in regulations, and what if any benefits will be 
experienced by the consumer in respect to improved quality of care. 
Background and Need 
In the mid- 1900s, poorhouses were established in the United States as a place for the 
poor and infirm to reside.  Poor houses were supported with federal tax dollars, and eventually 
became the nursing home as we know it today (Winzelberg, 2003).  As part of the establishment 
of the Social Security Act in 1935, management of the funding of benefits for the aged were 
transitioned to State agencies (ssa.gov, n.d.).  During this time, there were several concerns 
raised by both the public and political sectors regarding the poor conditions and quality of care in 
nursing homes (IOM, 1986), though the licensing and/ or regulatory process was discouraged 




and 1940s, the sense was that most nursing homes could not meet the basic requirements of the 
regulatory process and therefore would have been forced to close.  
In the 1950s, a study conducted by the Council of State Governments found that nursing 
homes were not providing quality services (IOM, 1986) and many were considered 
‘substandard.’  From this study, the Public Health Service began consideration of licensing 
programs at the state level (IOM, 1986).  Through these processes, many homes continued to be 
labeled as ‘substandard’, though the continued fear of enforcement shutting down the operations 
of the homes prohibited pursuance of the issues as it was thought that it would take time for 
homes to comply with standards (United States Special Committee on Aging, 1975). 
By 1961, the United States Senate had created the Special Committee on Aging, chaired 
by Utah Senator Frank Moss (IOM, 1986).  The Committee held several hearings on the issues 
that had been experienced in nursing homes, and by 1963, the first standards for nursing homes 
receiving Federal funding were issued (IOM, 1986).  Two years later, in 1965, Amendments to 
the Social Security Act created the Medicare (healthcare coverage for those 65 and over) and 
Medicaid (healthcare coverage for low income individuals) programs (Eskildsen & Price, 2009).  
By 1966, the percentage of nursing home residents receiving Medicaid was over 60% (IOM, 
1986).  The demands made by members of Congress, consumers, and advocacy groups for 
nursing homes receiving federal funding to meet basic standards and requirements was profound. 
In the 1970s, nursing homes garnered the attention of the public and policymakers due to 
negative outcomes including abuse, bed sores, and poor care (Kapp, 2014).  Under the Nixon 
Administration, oversight of nursing home regulations transitioned from the State to the Federal 
level (Hovey, 2000).  Frank Moss (D-UT), Chair of the Special Committee on Aging went 




this experience, the Moss Committee (IOM, 1986) was established and began holding hearings 
over a 4-year period to establish testimony against federal regulatory efforts.  Stories continued 
to be published regarding the horrors of nursing homes; a fire that killed 32 residents in a nursing 
home in Ohio, food poisoning that killed 36 residents in a nursing home in Maryland, and a class 
action lawsuit, Smith v. O’Halloran, was filed in Colorado by a group of nursing home residents 
receiving Medicaid (Horowitz, 2009).  The lawsuit claimed that the federal government, and 
specifically the Secretary of HHS, had not followed through on their responsibilities to ensure 
quality of care in nursing homes, and they had suffered needlessly because of it.   
In 1980, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) proposed changes to nursing 
home rules to include evaluation of the care provided to residents (IOM, 1986).  These proposed 
changes were not passed into law and remained in a holding pattern through the end of the Carter 
administration.  A new reform effort was initiated by the incoming Reagan Administration, who 
sought to streamline the regulations for nursing homes (Kapp, 2014) and allow for facilities with 
good survey and certification records to achieve compliance through accreditation by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (American Association of Homes and Services for the 
Aging, 2008).  These proposed changes produced negative reactions from several stakeholders, 
including lawmakers, consumers, and providers (IOM, 1986).  Most believed that the proposed 
changes did not address the “fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory system” (AAHSA, 2008, 
p.17).  The reactions resulted in the proposed changes to nursing home regulations being 
postponed and left the prior rules from 1974 in effect.  Additionally, during this time, a federal 
court ruled that Medicaid Law requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to prove that 
providers receiving federal funds are meeting the requirements of participation in the program, 




In 1983, Congress asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct a review of nursing 
home performance.  The 18- month study of nursing home issues by the IOM Committee 
resulted in numerous regulatory recommendations per members of the committee, few of which 
were supported by evidenced-based research or outcomes (Kapp, 2014).  In addition to the IOM 
Committee findings and recommendations, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a 
report detailing its concerns with the lack of oversight of nursing homes by DHHS (Horowitz, 
2009).  The “window of opportunity” (Longest, 2016, p.136) was provided for stricter regulatory 
oversight due to the ongoing, publicized issues with nursing homes, along with the Smith v. 
O’Halloran case “winding its way through courts” (Horowitz, 2009, p. 2).  As such, Congress 
chose to take the recommendations and incorporated them as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987, also known as the Nursing Home Reform Act (Brady, 
2001).  
Over the next two decades, there was little evidence that the influx of regulatory 
requirements on the long-term care industry had any effect on improving resident outcomes or 
quality of care.  The Minimum Data Set (MDS) was introduced in 1991, requiring SNFs/ NFs to 
assess residents health status and capabilities in performing activities of daily living (ADLs) 
(Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  The MDS is comprised of 350 areas of assessment completed for 
each short-stay and long-term resident in the SNF/ NF (Au et al, 2019; Eskildsen & Price, 2009; 
Grabowski et al, 2008).  The MDS is completed on minimum of a quarterly basis and transmitted 
to CMS where it is analyzed.  The data from MDS is aggregated to provide information at the 
facility, state, and national level for twenty-eight publicly reported quality measures (QMs) 




determine reimbursement rates and provide surveyors with focus areas for observation during 
regulatory compliance visits (Rahman & Applebaum, 2009). 
Quality measures (QMs) were developed by the Center for Health Systems Research and 
Analysis to provide indicators of structural, procedural, and outcome measures (Castle & 
Ferguson, 2010).  QMs were first publicly reported in 2002 as part of Nursing Home Compare.  
Despite the “overwhelmingly extensive and complex set of formal command-and-control rules 
we [have] promulgated on the federal and state levels to govern the operation of nursing homes” 
(Kapp, 2014, p.886-887) the industry continued to experience significant quality of care issues 
(Kumar, Norton & Ensinosa, 2006) as evidenced by continued citations of actual harm and 
immediate jeopardy survey results.  The idea of “deemed status” (Hovey, 2000, p.52) emerged 
again in 1998, as it had in the 1980’s, proposing the idea of allowing accreditation through 
JCAHO (similar to oversight of hospitals) to improve quality and decrease the costs of regulatory 
oversight.  This idea was quickly dismissed due to opposition from the Clinton Administration, 
interest groups such as AARP, stating JCAHO did not meet the necessary standards of oversight 
required for nursing homes (Hovey, 2000). 
In 2005, CMS began the pilot of a new survey process in five states to achieve a more 
systematic, objective approach to the survey process and address the ongoing concerns expressed 
by the GAO and Congress regarding the regulatory oversight of nursing homes.  The Quality 
Indicator Survey (QIS) was developed in response to criticisms of the current process for survey 
and certification in nursing homes which had been voiced by consumers, providers, Congress, 
GAO, survey agencies as well as CMS (White et al, 2007).  The goals of the QIS survey were to 
increase the accuracy and efficiency of the survey process in addition to providing increased 




A 2007 study completed by ABT found the QIS survey failed to attain any of its primary 
goals (White et al, 2007).  The study assessed quality in the five domains of incontinence, 
nutrition, pressure ulcers, choice, and activities.  There were no differences found in accuracy or 
relationship between quality and citations received by facilities undergoing the QIS and standard 
survey (White et al, 2007) and “both failed to detect many residents with poor pressure ulcer and 
weight loss outcomes” (White et al, 2007, p. v).   
On May 15, 2008, Congressman Stupak (D-MI) requested release of the CMS report 
regarding the evaluation of the QIS pilot at a Meeting of the House Committee on Energy & 
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (AAHSA, 2008).  He was told that 
the report was not available by the Acting Administrator of CMS, Kerry Weems, who cited that 
it was still being finalized and an action plan was being developed prior to making the report 
available to the Committee (AAHSA, 2008).  This report was not made available to the 
Committee until the following summer, as CMS did not wish the Committee to see the failure of 
the attempt to improve the survey and certification process through the new QIS process (White 
et al, 2007).   
The micro aspect of the regulatory process is met with disdain by providers due to the 
punitive and disheartening survey process (Walshe, 2001).  Consumers (patients, residents, 
family members) have mixed feelings about these policies.  Some are frustrated with the 
stringent ‘rules’ that come as part of the regulatory process and inhibit their ability to live in their 
home; simple pleasures such as a choice of curtains, having a coffee maker, or keeping eye drops 
at their bedside become non-existent due to the need to achieve regulatory compliance (Kapp, 
2000).  At the local, state, and national levels, stakeholders deploy a variety of methods to have 




Federalism is well represented when it comes to policymaking and regulatory oversight 
of long-term care facilities (Longest, 2016; Walshe, 2001).  Every level of government is 
involved in a specific way, with a great deal of overlap.  The Requirements of Participation 
(RoP) are finalized in the Legislative Branch, and implemented by the Executive Branch, 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  The RoP, or regulations, are monitored and 
enforced at both the State and Federal levels.  At the local level, many cities, towns, and/ or 
counties have their own requirements and/ or regulations pertaining to nursing homes, such as 
licensure for convalescent care or food licensing.  Furthermore, skilled nursing and long-term 
care facilities are reimbursed for care and services provided to most residents by the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (Medicare beneficiaries) and by State Departments of Health and 
Human Services (Medicaid beneficiaries), the same agencies responsible for ensuring regulatory 
compliance. 
Historically, policy actors have capitalized on the opportunity to draw attention to 
adverse stories of nursing homes and “play on the fears of the politically powerful baby boom 
generation” (Brady, 2001, p.3) to gain votes by advocating for tougher regulatory oversight. 
Reviewing the history of regulations in long-term care, there are several examples of “legislators 
as suppliers” (Longest, 2016, p. 69); from the Congressman that shared his own story as an 
orderly in a nursing home during the Moss hearings (IOM, 1986) to support the need for 
additional regulations to address the poor care and neglect he witnessed, to the experienced 
shared by Moss himself as an ‘undercover’ resident of a nursing home (Etzioni, 1977).  As stated 
by Hovey (2000), “every time an expose of poor nursing home care is presented in the media, 
there is a call among our political leaders to crack down on the nursing home industry” (p.43).  




votes, without consideration for the long-term impact of the costs, both to providers (costs to 
comply) and regulators (cost to enforce) (Longest, 2016).  Alternatively, Hoffman (2018) argues 
that public choice theory deters politicians from focusing on issues pertaining to the aging 
population due to the high cost of funding programs.  Hoffman believes there is a general 
tendency of political actors and the public to avoid the ‘non-glamorous’ issues of aging and 
mortality as they are generally viewed as unpleasant and do not assist in gaining votes. 
In 2015, CMS published the Proposed Rule outlining substantial changes to the 
regulations for long-term care, the first of its kind since OBRA in 1987 (Unroe, Ouslander & 
Saliba, 2017).  Thousands of public comments were made, resulting in changes in the effective 
date(s) of the proposed regulations.  The purpose of the final rule is to update regulatory 
requirements for SNFs/ NFs to meet the needs of both short-stay and long-term care residents, as 
well as the differences in acuity of the population as compared to twenty-five years prior.  The 
final rule, published in October 2016, is arranged to be implemented in three phases (Figure 1) 













Figure 1.  Requirements of Participation: Phases I, II, III, and Effective Dates 
Source:  Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017) 
Problem Statement 
Long-term care has a lengthy history of stringent regulations developed in response to 
highly publicized poor outcomes (Eskildsen & Price, 2009).  Phase I of the Medicare and 
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities went into effect on 
November 27, 2016. According to Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017), the cost of 
implementing these rules is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000 
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per year thereafter.  However, it is not known if these costly new rules have any impact on 
quality of care. 
Research Question and Research Hypotheses 
How do CMS quality measures (QMs) compare pre- and post-implementation of Phase I 
of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care 
Facilities? 
H1.  The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened 
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
      H2.  The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will 
decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
H3.  The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline post-
implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will 
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
The four quality measures (QMs) included in this study were selected for several reasons.    
These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward, 2016) and exist as publicly 
reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase I RoP.  Additionally, all 
have been utilized as indicators of quality of care in SNFs/NFs in prior studies (Castle & 
Ferguson, 2010; Grabowski et al, 2008; Kapp, 2000; Kumar, Norton & Encinosa, 2006; Wade, 
2016) and in quality initiatives such as Advancing Excellence and the National Nursing Home 
Quality Improvement Campaign (http://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/).  According to Castle & 
Ferguson (2010), the QMs selected for this study are “quality indicators used in prominent 




2008; three of the four QMs in this study have been publicly reported since 2010 (see Table 3).   
Population 
This is a retrospective program evaluation of quality of care using data from Nursing 
Home Compare.  Nursing Home Compare data are collected by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid (CMS) Nursing Home Compare MDS Quality Measures (QMs).  This data is derived 
from nursing home resident’s Minimum Data Set (MDS), transmitted to CMS by Medicare and 
Medicaid certified facilities.  The files are available to the public for all nursing home-based 
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and nursing facilities (NFs), and exclude critical access hospital 
(CAH) swing beds.  QMs are available on a national level and provide information about the 
quality of care provided in SNFs/ NFs (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  The variables needed for each 
of the measures are publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Nursing 
Home Compare online database.  Data sets were compared for the year prior to implementation 
(January to December 2015) and one year after (January to December 2017) the change in the 
RoP for 14,210 SNFs/ NFs in the United States. 
Three of the overarching themes of the Phase I RoP include Pharmacy Services, Resident 
Rights, and Quality of Care.  For purposes of this study, the corresponding quality measure(s) are 
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 
As noted in Chapter I, there is limited empirical evidence pertaining to the effects of 
increased regulations on quality of care in skilled nursing facilities.  Reference to regulatory 
stringency and quality improvement in evidence-based studies conducted apropos nursing home 
quality measures and improvement initiatives is scant (Kumar et al, 2006).  Several sources of 
literature were reviewed through EMbase, MEDLINE, Scopus, and HEINOnline.  Keywords 
include regulatory requirements, Medicare regulations, skilled nursing facilities, quality of care, 
and quality measures as well as Boolean operator (AND).  Studies, articles, and books pertaining 
to quality measures and regulatory oversight in skilled nursing facilities over the past twenty-five 
years were reviewed.   
Most of the literature reviewed contemplate the relationships between quality measures 
and five-star ratings, the scrutiny of the regulatory process, and the flaws in regulatory oversight 
(Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Levenson, 2010; Walshe, 2001).  OBRA regulations were 
implemented in 1987, however, quality measures were not developed and implemented until 
2002 (Grabowski et al, 2008).  Therefore, it is possible that prior studies did not have 
comparison groups or the ability to measure quality of care and the effect of regulatory changes 
pre- and post-implementation (Walshe, 2001).  The RoP of 2016 is the first major overhaul of 
SNF regulations since 1991; the addition of the quality measures in 2002 allows for 
measurement of the effectiveness of regulatory stringency on quality of care. 
Regulations and Quality of Care 
In his article, Winzelberg (2003) argues the regulation of nursing homes over the past 50 
years has not ensured or improved quality of care in skilled nursing facilities/ nursing facilities 




regarding the quality of care provided in SNFs/NFs.  Determining whether the regulations 
themselves, and/ or the enforcement of such are the issue remains a challenge for researchers 
(Kapp, 2000; Winzelberg, 2003).  Increases in civil monetary penalties for deficiencies and 
increased transparency via mandatory public reporting have yet to resolve the issue.  Despite the 
lack of evidence proving the effectiveness of increased regulations, policymakers continue to 
believe this is the best way to ensure quality of care.   
Traditionally, SNF/NF deficiencies cited during annual or complaint surveys conducted 
by state agencies are used to determine the level of quality in nursing homes.  There are 
numerous issues with the process, foremost being the inconsistency amongst surveyors and State 
survey teams in the number and levels of citations (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Winzelberg, 2003).  
The number of differences amongst SNFs presents an additional challenge to defining quality.  
Approximately 90% of SNFs/NFs receive Medicare and Medicaid funding in the United States 
(Mukamel et al, 2011).  Though all are part of the same comparison group, they vary in the types 
of care, comorbidities, and population they service.  Additionally, States vary in philosophies 
pertaining to regulation and control of markets, some having a higher level of regulatory 
stringency compared with others.  Comparing survey results as a means of defining levels of 
quality of care becomes increasingly challenging considering these differences.  A change to 
accreditation to improve quality of care in nursing homes, along with a process to promote 
innovative practices is suggested (Kapp, 2000; Winzelberg, 2003).  Standardization of the survey 
process and the development of programs to allow surveyors to focus on the homes requiring a 
higher level of oversight and separating the survey and enforcement agencies to decrease 




The consequences for non-compliance with regulatory standards include fines, citations, 
and mandatory personnel changes (Mukamel et al, 2012).  Enforcement agencies and providers 
incur these costs of compliance.  A quantitative study by Mukamel et al. (2012) utilized 2005 
and 2006 MDS data for 16,352 Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes in the United 
States to determine the effect of regulations on quality.  The objective of the study was to 
determine if stringent quality regulations are cost-effective and contribute to better quality 
nursing home care.  The study considered structural, process, and outcome measures of quality. 
The study addressed the endogeneity between regulations and quality by utilizing instrumental 
variables.  The Harrington Regulation Stringency Index (HRSI) was used as a cost measure.  Z 
scores were calculated for average deficiencies (citations) per facility, percent of facilities with 
any deficiencies, percent of facilities with deficiencies of G level scope and severity or greater, 
percent of facilities substandard, and civil monetary penalties per facility.  Logistic regression 
allowed for the calculation of risk-adjusted rates by facility, with a score of 1 or greater 
indicating worse than average, less than one indicating better than average quality.  The study 
controlled for competition, market median income, hospital wage index, 2004 Medicaid rates, 
facility size, ownership, hospital, multi-facility organization, and staffing standards.  Two-stage 
least-squares models were estimated for each of seven quality measures to analyze the 
relationship between regulation and quality.  
Results of the study found significant discrepancies in HRSI and quality measures 
amongst States.  Four of the seven areas of quality outlined in the study, including CNA and 
LPN staffing, urinary incontinence, and ADL decline were found to improve with increased 
regulatory stringency.  RN staffing, high-risk pressure ulcers, and hotel expenditures were not 




effectiveness standpoint, the authors pose the question of regulatory stringency versus increasing 
competition and transparency regarding care outcomes (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Mukamel et 
al, 2012).  Overall, the study reports competition is more effective than regulatory stringency in 
ensuring quality of care, however, regulation is more effective in ensuring quality than progress 
reports. 
In the United States, Medicaid is the primary payer for nursing home care, accounting for 
sixty to seventy percent of nursing home bed days (Grabowski et al, 2008; Hoffman, 2018).  In 
2015, the average Medicaid shortfall in the US was -11.8% (AHCA, 2016).  While Medicare 
funding can make up for some of the deficit, SNF/NF margins continue to decline, totally 12.5% 
in 2015.  Because Medicare accounts for a much smaller percent of bed days, approximately 
14.2% in 2014, total margins were -2.5% in 2015. Private rates can be increased to offset some 
of the deficit; however, only 10-20% of nursing home bed days are reimbursed with private 
funds, including long-term care insurance (AHCA, 2016; Hoffman, 2018). The regulatory 
mandates to increase levels of nursing staff, including Registered Nurses (RNs), Licensed 
Practical Nurses (LPNs) and Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) is expensive, considering there 
are no increases in reimbursement levels to support doing so.  A study by Bowblis (2015) used 
1999-2004 Medicare Cost Reports and OSCAR data for 13,318 nursing homes to determine the 
financial impact on SNFs after implementation of the minimum staffing requirements 
regulations.  Medicare and Medicaid provided seventy-five percent of the funding for the SNFs 
included in the study.  Bowblis’ study references the unintended negative consequences of 
regulators attempting to improve quality of care actually having the opposite effect by causing 
SNFs to endure a deficit, resulting in a negative impact on resident quality of care. Levenson 




meet quality standards.  Payment policies must consider the acuity, needs, and preferences of the 
resident as opposed to diagnosis or issue.   
Quality Measures and Quality of Care 
 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) utilizes data from the MDS to 
calculate publicly reported quality measures for nursing homes (Wade, 2016).  The QM data was 
developed to assist consumers in obtaining information about quality of care in nursing homes.  
Data is updated quarterly and publicly available on the Nursing Home Compare website 
(medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare).  The data represent process and outcome measures; 
however, they do not capture engagement measures such as satisfaction and relationships with 
caregivers (Kapp, 2000). 
The four quality measures selected for the study, including percentage of short-stay 
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who 
self-report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically 
restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who got an antipsychotic medication were 
chosen for several reasons.  These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward, 
2016) and exist as publicly reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase 
I RoP.  Prior studies have utilized pressure ulcers, restraints, pain, and antipsychotic use as 
measurements of quality of care (Miller et al, 2014; Mukamel et al, 2012).  Mukamel (2012) 
included MDS data for decline in ADLs, high-risk pressure ulcers, and urinary incontinence as 







Table 1. CMS Quality Measures and Implementation Dates      
 
 
 Quality Measure Date Implemented 
Short-Stay 
Percent of Residents 
with Pressure Ulcers 




Percent of residents 
who self-report 
moderate to severe 
pain 
10/1/2010 
Percent of Residents 
who were Physically 
Restrained 
10/1/2010 
Percent of Residents 




Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2019) 
A study by Grabowski et al. (2008) used MDS data for 12 quality indicators to determine 
the effect of payer source on nursing home quality.  The study collected OSCAR data to 
determine descriptive statistics for the 1.6 million residents included in the study.  Payer 
information for each of the seven States included in the study was obtained from each Medicaid 
office.  Linear regression models tested the relationship between the independent and dependent 




quality of care amongst payer sources, specifically Medicaid, in comparison with higher paying 
sources including Medicare and private resources. 
A study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Swafford, Miller, Tsai, Herr, 
and Ersek, 2009) conducted a literature synthesis to find evidenced-based information regarding 
the effectiveness and improvement activities pertaining to pain management in nursing homes.  
A total of 472 articles were initially reviewed by the lead author, with 419 excluded for not 
meeting the specific criteria of the study.  The remaining 53 articles were reviewed by two 
authors, with 10 meeting the final criteria for the study specific to systematic approaches to pain 
practices in nursing homes.  The research found the most successful programs following a 
quality improvement methodology, with the use of established pain management quality 
improvement teams, ongoing education, and support from internal and/ or external consultants.  
A process for ongoing monitoring and revisions of the program, as well as the use of tools and 
resources for pain assessment and interventions were suggested.  Additionally, opportunities to 
work with other facilities to foster sharing of best practices and support were also determined to 
have a meaningful effect on the improvement of pain management practices in nursing homes.   
The practices in the literature varied from the use of MDS data to verbal pain reporting 
processes (Swafford et al, 2009).  A statistically significant impact on the assessment and 
management of pain was noted for facilities receiving education, support, and/ or utilizing a 
quality improvement methodology.  The study noted the critical elements of successful pain 
management programs as those of organizational structure, assessment and management of pain 
processes, educational opportunities, and measurement of pain.   
Pressure ulcers reflect staffing levels and competency of staff, which are meaningful 




ulcers have a significant impact on quality of life, including risk of infection, decrease in 
ambulatory status, pain, an increased need for care and services, and risk of mortality. Financial 
implications for both provider and resident range between $10,000 and $86,000 (Clarke et al, 
2005) per pressure ulcer.  A study by Au et al. (2019) references the beneficial impact of quality 
improvement methodologies in the management of skin integrity processes (systems) in SNFs.  
A proactive approach to pressure ulcer prevention, including staffing levels, equipment, 
reimbursement rates, and training, is a notable measure of quality of care (Gruneir & Mor, 2008).  
Important components include the ability to assess, document, and track measurements and 
characteristics for existing wounds.   
According to CMS (Reform of Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, 2016) and 
several studies, antipsychotic utilization is another important indicator of quality of care (Lau, 
Kasper, Potter & Lyles, 2004; Lucas et al, 2014).  The reform created a new category of 
regulations under ‘Pharmacy Services’, moving antipsychotic regulations from the quality of 
care category.  Despite this change, the use of psychotropic drugs is considered an indicator of 
quality of care, defined by CMS as achieving or maintaining the highest level of well-being 
according to patient-directed preferences and care needs.   
In the United States, over 50% of nursing home residents have a diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease or another dementia (Harris-Kojetin et al., 2016).  Most of these patients 
have lost their ability to communicate verbally and non-verbally due to the progression of the 
disease.  This loss of ability to communicate results in patients demonstrative aggressive, 
paranoid, sometimes destructive behaviors (Salzman, 2013).  Medications such as 
benzodiazepines and antidepressants have been utilized to treat these behavioral and 




& Spina, 2014).  Due to the lack of effective medications, providers turned to antipsychotic 
medications to treat these patients (Salzman, 2013).  Additionally, the use of physical restraints 
has been associated with higher rates of injury in SNF/ NF residents (Neufeld et al, 1999).   
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) conducted a study in 2006 to 
determine the effects of antipsychotics on the rate of mortality for elderly patients with dementia 
(Maglione et al, 2011).  The study found the mortality rate for those receiving antipsychotics to 
be 3.5% as compared to 2.3% for those receiving the placebo (Maglione et al, 2011).  In 2007, 
the Office of Inspector General embarked on a study at the request of Senator Charles Grassley 
regarding the use of antipsychotic medications in nursing home residents (Levinson, 2011).  The 
results of the study were published in 2011, reporting that approximately 14% of nursing home 
residents with dementia received an antipsychotic medication for a diagnosis unrelated to those 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The FDA black box warning 
specifically reads “increased mortality in elderly patients with dementia related psychosis” 
(Levinson, 2011, p.4).  Though the drugs are approved for use in patients diagnosed with 
Huntington’s disease, Tourette’s disorder and schizophrenia, they are commonly used for 
nursing home patients with diagnoses of dementia with psychosis or dementia with behavioral 
disturbances.  This information, in addition to the high costs of atypical antipsychotic use- $13 
billion in 2007 alone- caused the OIG to call for major changes in the use of these medications in 
the elderly with a diagnosis of dementia in nursing homes. 
Five-Star Rating 
 In 2008, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) developed and 
implemented the Five-Star Quality Ratings, publicly available on Nursing Home Compare  




consumers in assessing and selecting nursing homes based on a variety of factors, including 
inspection results, staffing, and quality indicators (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2019).   
Figure 3.  Conceptual Model, Overall Five-Star Rating Composition 
 
 Health Inspections.  Results of the last three health inspection surveys are compiled to 
develop a five-star rating for this component.  Each nursing home is given a rating of one to five 
stars in comparison to other nursing homes in their State.  A number of points are assigned to 
each deficiency received, with a greater number of points assigned to deficiencies of higher 


























Table 2.  Scope and Severity, Health Inspection Deficiencies 
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, October 2019, p. 3 
 The nursing homes with the lowest number of points are granted a five-star rating as a top 
10% performer within their State.  The middle performers (seventy percent of the homes in the 
State) are assigned two, three, or four stars.  The bottom 20%, considered low performers, are 
given a one-star rating.  The relative weight of the prior three recertification and complaint 
surveys are detailed in Table 6. 
Table 3. Five-Star Health Inspection Composition 
Recertification 
Weight Contribution to 
Five-Star Health 
Inspection Rating Complaint 
Weight Contribution 
to Five-Star Health 
Inspection Rating 
Most Recent 50% 12 months or less 50% 
Second Most Recent 33.3% 13-24 months 33.3% 
Third Most Recent 16.7% 25-36 months 16.7% 
 
 The health inspection component of the overall five-star rating is updated monthly to 
account for recent recertification, complaint, and follow-up surveys.   
Staffing.  The staffing component of the five-star rating is based on total nursing, 




and RN staffing.  Staffing numbers are submitted by providers electronically on a quarterly basis 
to CMS via the Payroll-Based Journal (PBJ) (CMS, 2019).  Hours per resident day are calculated 
and adjusted for resident acuity based on MDS data.  The staffing component of the five-star 
rating is updated quarterly. 
Quality Measures. The quality measure component of the five-star rating is updated 
quarterly based on fifteen quality measures derived from the MDS or Medicare claims-based 
data (CMS, 2019).  Scores are calculated for long-stay, short-stay, and overall quality measures 
(Table 4).  The overall quality measure score is utilized in the overall five-star facility rating.  
Nursing homes are given points for each quality measure (Tables 7, 8), with a higher score 
representing higher quality. Four quarters of data are utilized to develop the quality measure 


























Percent of residents whose need for help 
with activities of daily living has 
increased 
Long-Stay MDS 150 
Percent of residents whose ability to move 
independently worsened 
Long-Stay MDS 150 
Percent of high-risk residents with 
pressure ulcers 
Long-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of residents who have/had a 
catheter inserted and left in their bladder 
Long-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of long-stay residents who report 
moderate to severe pain** 
Long-Stay MDS ** 
Percent of residents with a urinary tract 
infection 
Long-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of residents experiencing one or 
more falls with major injury 
Long-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of residents who received an 
antipsychotic medication 
Long-Stay MDS 150 
Number of hospitalizations per 1,000 
long-stay resident days 
Long-Stay Claims 150 
Number of outpatient emergency 
department (ED) visits per 1,000 long-
stay resident days 
Long-Stay Claims 150 
Percent of residents who made 
improvement in function 
Short-Stay MDS 150 
Percent of SNF residents with pressure 
ulcers that are new or worsened 
Short-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of residents who newly received 
an antipsychotic medication 
Short-Stay MDS 100 
Percent of short-stay residents who report 
moderate to severe pain** 
Short-Stay MDS ** 
Percent of short-stay residents who were 
re-hospitalized after a nursing home 
admission 
Short-Stay Claims 150 
Percent of short-stay residents who have 
had an outpatient emergency department 
(ED) visit 
Short-Stay Claims 150 
Rate of successful return to home and 
community from a SNF 
Short-Stay Claims 150 
**In October 2019, CMS removed the quality measures for percentage of long- and short-stay residents reporting moderate to 
severe pain.  This change was made due to speculation nursing homes with higher rates of pain may seek intervention with 
opioids (CMS, 2019), a conflict of interest with the current opioid crisis in the United States.  These measures have been in place 
since 2010 and have been a meaningful measure of quality of care in several studies (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Dulal, 2018; 
Grabowski et al, 2008; Xu et al, 2016).  With data available through 2019, the pain quality measure for long-stay residents will 
be utilized in this study. 





Table 5.  Overall Quality Measure Rating Categories 












Overall Rating.  The CMS considers health inspection ratings to be most important in 
providing an overall five-star rating for each nursing home.  Overall rating begins with health 
inspection star rating, with one star added for staffing rating of four to five or subtracted for 
staffing rating of one.  One star is then added for a quality measure rating of five or subtracted 

















CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY 
This study is a retrospective program evaluation using data from the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Nursing Home Compare to compare nursing home 
quality measures pre- and post-implementation of Phase I of the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities.  Nursing Home Compare data 
are collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) Nursing Home Compare MDS 
Quality Measures (QMs).  This data is derived from nursing home resident’s Minimum Data Set 
(MDS), transmitted to CMS by Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities.  The files are 
available to the public for all nursing home-based skilled nursing facilities and exclude critical 
access hospital (CAH) swing beds.  QMs are available on a national level and provide 
information about the quality of care provided in SNFs/ NFs (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  
The four quality measures selected for this study include the percentage of short-stay 
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who 
self-report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically 
restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who got an antipsychotic medication were 
selected for several reasons.  These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward, 
2016) and exist as publicly reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase 
I RoP.  Additionally, all have been utilized as indicators of quality of care in SNFs/NFs in prior 
studies (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Grabowski et al, 2008; Kapp, 2000; Kumar, Norton & 
Encinosa, 2006; Wade, 2016) and in quality initiatives such as Advancing Excellence and the 
National Nursing Home Quality Improvement Campaign (http://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/).  
According to Castle & Ferguson (2010), the QMs selected for this study are “quality indicators 




reported by CMS since 2008; three of the four QMs in this study have been publicly reported 
since 2010 (see Table 3).   
Quality measures provide information on structural, process, and outcome measures in 
nursing homes.  For the purposes of this study, process and outcome measures are used to 
determine the effect of the RoP Phase I on quality in nursing homes.  The process measures 
indicate what the SNF/ NF is doing to provide care and services to residents.  Outcomes 
measures indicate the effectiveness of processes and systems.   
 
Figure 4.  Process and 
Outcome Measures 
 
Research Design  
A quantitative approach to test the four study hypotheses was conducted.  This approach 
was used based on the quantitative nature of the data used in the study, and the lack of prior 
statistical analysis regarding the impact of regulatory stringency on quality measures in SNFs/ 
NFs.  The quality measures included in this study have been used as measures of quality in prior 
studies, with three of the four- pressure ulcers, restraints, and pain- endorsed by the National 





















The datasets from January to December 2015 and January to December 2017 were 
downloaded from https://data.medicare.gov/data/nursing-home-compare.  SNFs/ NFs with 
missing data were excluded, as well as those who operate as part of a hospital.  The dataset was 
cleaned to eliminate SNFs/ NFs with missing data and to solely include the quality measure 
variables of interest to the study (Figure 5).  The final sample size for the study included 14,210 
Medicare and/ or Medicare certified skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs) in 
the United States.  SNFs/ NFs residing in a hospital were excluded due to the distinct differences 
in comparison with non-hospital-based facilities.  
The measure score was filtered by inclusion criteria, comprised of ownership, bed 
certification, location (state), and zip code.  These variables were included due to the evidence-
base supporting the influence of ownership, number of beds per facility, and local markets on 
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Table 6.  Covariates and Definitions 
Covariate Definition Type 
Bed Cert 




For profit- Corporation 
For profit- Individual 
For profit- Limited 
liability 








Non profit- Church 
related 
Non profit- Corporate 







Provider Zip Code 5-digit zip code 
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.  
  
Instrumentation  
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used to analyze and 
compare data by quarter for January to December 2015 (pre-implementation) and January to 
December 2017 (post-implementation) of the 2016 Medicare RoP Phase I.     
Data Set Description  
Publicly available archival data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) Nursing Home Compare (https://data.medicare.gov/data/nursing-home-compare) for 14, 




Minimum Data Set (MDS), completed quarterly for all SNF/ NF residents.  The MDS is 
completed by professional staff in the SNF/ NF and transmitted to CMS, where it is added to a 
national database (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019).   
Table 7. Quality Measures: Definition, Numerator, and Denominator 
Quality Measure Definition Numerator Denominator Exclusions 
Percentage of Short-Stay 
residents with pressure 
ulcers that are new or 
worsened 
% short-stay residents with 
new or worsened pressure 
ulcers stage II-IV 
Short-stay residents with 
new or worsening stage II-
IV pressure ulcer(s) in past 
quarter) 
All residents with 
assessments in 
past quarter 
Data from look-back 
unavailable 
Percentage of Long-Stay 
residents who report 
moderate to severe pain 
% long-stay residents who 
report at consistent moderate 
to severe pain in the past 5 
days OR one episode of 
severe pain 
Long-stay residents who 
report: 1)at least one episode 
of daily moderate/ severe 








indicators and/ or 
those not assessed 
Percentage of Long-Stay 
residents who were 
physically restrained 
% long-stay residents with 
daily physically restraint 
Long-stay residents with 
daily trunk or limb restraints 
or prevention of rising from 
bed or chair 
All residents with 
assessments in 
past quarter 
Areas of MDS 
Section P that are not 
assessed (trunk, limb 
restraints, chair 
prevents rising) 
Percentage of Long-Stay 
residents who received an 
antipsychotic medication 
% of long-stay residents who 
received antipsychotic in the 
quarter (if MDS completed 
in quarter) 











Huntingtons Disease  
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2019) 
Variables 
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the changes that occurred to the selected 
quality measures (Table 8).  These include four quality measures: percentage of short-stay 
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who 
report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained, 
and percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication.  The quality 




descriptive statistics summarizing the number of certified beds in the nursing home, ownership 
type, and location. 
Table 8.  Variables 
Variables 
Percentage of Short-
Stay residents with 
pressure ulcers that 
are new or worsened 
Percentage of Long-
Stay residents who 














Number of Certified 
Beds 
Ownership State Zip Code 
 
Table 9. Quality Measures: Implementation, Definition, Type 






Percent of Residents 
with Pressure Ulcers 
that are New or 
Worsened 
10/1/2010 
% short-stay residents with 
new or worsened pressure 
ulcers stage II-IV 
Numerical 
Long Stay 
Percent of residents 
who self-report 
moderate to severe 
pain 
10/1/2010 
% long-stay residents who 
report at least one episode of 
moderate to severe pain in the 
past 5 days 
Numerical 
Percent of Residents 
who were Physically 
Restrained 
10/1/2010 
% long-stay residents with 
daily physically restraint 
Numerical 
Percent of Residents 




% of long-stay residents who 
received antipsychotic in the 




Research Question and Research Hypotheses 




of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care 
Facilities? 
H1.  The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened 
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
      H2.  The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will 
decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
H3.  The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline post-
implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will 
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to identify trends pre- and post-implementation of the 
Requirements of Participation Phase I.  Univariate analysis was conducted separately for each of 
the four quality measures to determine the mean and standard deviation.  Normally continuous 
variables were tested using a t-test. Non-normally distributed continuous data were tested 
utilizing nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon), and categorical data were compared using a Chi-square 
test.  A bivariate analysis was conducted for each of the 4 quality measures, comparing means by 
quarter from prior to implementation of RoP (2015) and post implementation of RoP (2017).  
The mean and standard deviation for each of the quality measures are reported in Table 12.  
Logistic models were used to examine effect of contextual geographic measures as 
needed.  Logistic modeling of key measurements was conducted to determine the influence of 




factors with significant p values.  States with significance were placed in the comparison group, 
while the remaining states were arranged to create the reference group (Table 10).   
Table 10.  Reference and Comparison Groups: Logistic Model 
States in Reference 
Group 
States in Comparison       
Group 
AK ND CT NY 
AL NH DE OH 
AR NM FL OK 
AZ NV IA OR 
CA PA ID SD 
CO PR IL TN 
DC RI KY WI 
GA SC LA   
HI TX MA   
IN UT ME   
KS VA MO   
MD VT MS   
MI WA NE   
MN WV NJ   
MT WY   
NC     
 
Limitations 
There are limitations to the use of quality measures (QMs) as quality of care metric.  
QMs are derived from minimum data set (MDS) information.  The MDS is completed by facility 
staff, and despite training, there is room for subjectivity or errors in data entry (Castle & 
Ferguson, 2010).  Interpretation of the questions and approaches to gathering data are potentially 
variable.   To address this issue, CMS implemented MDS focused surveys as means to 
substantiate the accuracy of MDS coding in SNFs/ NFs.   
Protection of Human Subjects 












CHAPTER IV RESULTS 
Results/Findings 
This retrospective study using data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) Nursing Home Compare was conducted to determine the effects of the Medicare and 
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) Phase I for Long-Term Care Facilities on four 
quality measures.  The publicly available dataset was revised to exclude critical access hospital 
(CAH) swing beds and facilities with missing data.  Approximately 800 facilities did not report 
quality measure data in either 2015 or 2017, potentially due to closure, de-certification, or new 
certification after 2015.  The final dataset included 14,210 Medicare and/or Medicaid certified 
Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs)/ Nursing Facilities (NFs) of the 15,600 in the United States, or 
ninety-one percent of facilities (Harris-Kojetin et al, 2019).  The Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used to analyze and compare data. 
 On average, there are 110.2 certified beds (SD 58.7) (Table 10).  The mean number of 
beds was the same (110.2) in both 2015 and 2017, with a .4 decrease in standard deviation from 
2015 (58.7) to 2017 (58.3).  The majority of SNFs/ NFs were owned by a for-profit corporation 
(9,235 or 65%), for-profit partnership (753 or 5.3%), or county government (400 or 2.8%).  
Figure 6 provides information regarding the percentage of for-profit facilities by state (Kaiser 











Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics: Number of Certified Beds and Ownership Type 
Organizational Characteristics 2015 2017 
Number of Certified Beds -Mean (std) 110.2 (58.7) 110.2 (58.3) 
Ownership Type n(%) 14210 (100)   
For profit- Corporation 9235 (65)   
For profit- Individual 486 (3.4)   
For profit- Limited Liability 51 (.4)   
For profit- Partnership 754 (5.3)   
Government- City 57 (.4)   
Government- City/ County 80 (.6)   
Government- County 400 (2.8)   
Government- Federal 12 (.1)   
Government- Hospital  110 (.8)   
Government- State 116 (.8)   
Non profit- Church related 542 (3.8)   
Non profit- Corporation 2204 (15.5)   

















Descriptive statistics were utilized to calculate the number and percentage of SNFs/NFs 
in each State (Table 11).  Of the top five States with the highest number of SNFs/NFs in the 
U.S., Texas (1140, 8%) and California (1071, 7.5%), comprise almost 16%.  Ohio (906, 6.4%), 









Table 12.  Number and Percentage of SNFs/ NFs by State 
State Number of Facilities Percent of Total SNFs/ NFs(U.S) 
AK 4.0 0.0 
AL 213.0 1.5 
AR 217.0 1.5 
AZ 138.0 1.0 
CA 1071.0 7.5 
CO 203.0 1.4 
CT 217.0 1.5 
DC 13.0 0.1 
DE 44.0 0.3 
FL 668.0 4.7 
GA 308.0 2.2 
HI 31.0 0.2 
IA 378.0 2.7 
ID 63.0 0.4 
IL 688.0 4.8 
IN 516.0 3.6 
KS 268.0 1.9 
KY 256.0 1.8 
LA 265.0 1.9 
MA 387.0 2.7 
MD 217.0 1.5 
ME 92.0 0.6 
MI 402.0 2.8 
MN 309.0 2.2 
MO 480.0 3.4 
MS 179.0 1.3 
MT 54.0 0.4 
NC 403.0 2.8 
ND 62.0 0.4 
NE 174.0 1.2 
NH 69.0 0.5 
NJ 339.0 2.4 
NM 66.0 0.5 
NV 44.0 0.3 
NY 556.0 3.9 
OH 906.0 6.4 
OK 281.0 2.0 
OR 132.0 0.9 
PA 660.0 4.6 
PR 2.0 0.0 
RI 81.0 0.6 
SC 173.0 1.2 
SD 89.0 0.6 
TN 291.0 2.0 
TX 1140.0 8.0 
UT 91.0 0.6 
VA 264.0 1.9 
VT 34.0 0.2 
WA 203.0 1.4 
WI 343.0 2.4 
WV 103.0 0.7 
WY 23.0 0.2 





 Non-parametric analysis was conducted using Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests to determine if 
there was a statistically significant difference in quality measures scores pre-implementation 
(2015) and post-implementation (2017) of the Requirements of Participation (RoP) (Table 12).  
This approach was used to compare the means for each quality measure by quarter and year. 
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H1.  The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened will 





Figure 7.  Percentage of Short-Stay Residents with Pressure Ulcers that are New or 
Worsened: Mean and Standard Deviation
 
The mean percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or 
worsened was unchanged when comparing quarter 1 in 2015 and quarter 1 2017 (p=0.96).  When 
comparing means for 2015 (range of 0.8 to 1.2) and 2017 (0.7 to 0.8) for quarters two, three, and 
four, all showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001).  Standard deviations (SD) reflect 
large variations in means for each quarter and year.  In 2015, standard deviation ranged from 1.4 
to 1.8.  In 2017, the range was 1.2 to 1.4.  The comparison of means shows a statistically 
significant decrease in the percentage of short- stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or 
worsened when comparing quarters two, three, and four in 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the 
null hypothesis (Figure 7). 
H2.  The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will 






Figure 8.  Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who Reported Moderate to Severe Pain: 
Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
The mean percentage and standard deviation showed a statistically significant decline 
quarters one through four in 2017 in comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001).  When comparing means 
for 2015 (range of 6.6 to 8.4) and 2017 (range of 5.0 to 5.7) for quarters two, three, and four, all 
showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001).  Standard deviations (SD) reflect large 
variations in means for each quarter and year.  In 2015, the standard deviation ranged from 6.3 to 
7.6.  In 2017, the range was 5.6 to 6.4.  The comparison of means and standard deviation reflect 
a statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay residents who reported moderate 
to severe pain when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the null hypothesis (Figure 8).   
H3.  The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline 







Figure 9.  Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who were Physically Restrained:  Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
 
The mean percentage and standard deviation of long-stay residents who were physically 
restrained showed a statistically significant decline quarters one through four in 2017 in 
comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001).  When comparing means for 2015 (range of 0.8- 1.0) and 2017 
(0.4) for quarters two, three, and four, all showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001).  
Standard deviations (SD) reflect large variations in each quarter of 2015 with a range of 2.5 to 
2.7 in 2015.  In 2017, the SD was consistent at 2.0. and a range of 2.0.  The comparison of means 
and standard deviation reflect a statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay 
residents who were physically restrained when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the 
null hypothesis (Figure 9).   
H4.  The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will 





Figure 10.  Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who Received an Antipsychotic 
Medication: Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
The mean percentage and standard deviation of long-stay residents who received an 
antipsychotic medication showed a statistically significant decline quarters one through four in 
2017 in comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001).  The mean percentage and standard deviation showed a 
statistically significant decline quarters one through four in 2017 in comparison to 2015 
(p=<.0001).  When comparing means for 2015 (range of 16.8 to 18.4) and 2017 (range of 15 to 
15.6) all quarters showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001).  Standard deviations (SD) 
reflect large variations in means for each quarter and year, with a range of 9.6 to 10.2 in 2015 
and a range of 9.5 to 9.9 in 2017.  The comparison of means and standard deviation reflect a 
statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay residents who received an 
antipsychotic medication when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the null hypothesis 





Table 14.  Odds Ratio results for Comparison Quarter 4 2015-2017  




% of long-stay residents 
who received an 
antipsychotic medication 
% of long-stay residents 
who self-report 
moderate to severe pain 
% of long-stay 
residents who were 
physically restrained 
% of short-stay residents 
with pressure ulcers that 
are new or worsened 
CT 1.034 (0.1797) 1.451 (0.0029) 2.208 (0.0003) 1.299 (0.2891) 
DE 0.383 (0.0114) 1.471 (0.1611) 1.205 (0.5845) 1.166 (0.8533) 
FL 1.174 (0.0002) 1.298 (0.0003) 2.478 (<.0001) 1.342 (0.0307) 
IA 0.815 (0.6106) 0.682 (0.0043) 0.615 (0.1778) 1.011 (0.6598) 
ID 0.367 (0.0023) 0.653 (0.205) 0.309 (0.0181) 0.736 (0.3088) 
IL 0.782 (0.2467) 1.16 (0.0165) 1.009 (0.1428) 0.998 (0.3884) 
KY 1.234 (0.0049) 1.464 (0.0008) 1.829 (<.0001) 1.016 (0.6599) 
LA 1.363 (0.0003) 1.891 (<.0001) 2.379 (<.0001) 0.831 (0.0861) 
MA 0.887 (0.7735) 1.326 (0.0018) 1.851 (<.0001) 1.325 (0.1101) 
ME 0.529 (0.0215) 0.413 (0.0008) 0.099 (0.0004) 1.189 (0.7225) 
MO 0.721 (0.0652) 0.715 (0.0061) 0.56 (0.0404) 1.154 (0.6453) 
MS 0.967 (0.4337) 1.321 (0.0299) 1.646 (0.003) 0.81 (0.1302) 
NE 0.764 (0.4349) 0.444 (<.0001) 0.171 (<.0001) 0.791 (0.1457) 
NJ 1.616 (<.0001) 1.315 (0.0068) 1.806 (<.0001) 1.377 (0.0703) 
NY 2.073 (<.0001) 1.793 (<.0001) 1.847 (<.0001) 1.366 (0.026) 
OH 1.343 (<.0001) 1.145 (0.011) 1.272 (0.0025) 1.255 (0.1224) 
OK 0.604 (0.0042) 0.912 (0.804) 0.437 (0.0086) 0.845 (0.0992) 
OR 0.618 (0.091) 0.294 (<.0001) 0.046 (<.0001) 1.21 (0.6043) 
SD 0.514 (0.0163) 0.666 (0.1067) 1.208 (0.361) 1.41 (0.4751) 
TN 1.282 (0.0014) 0.825 (0.317) 1.964 (<.0001) 1.085 (0.9899) 
WI 0.727 (0.1316) 0.725 (0.0289) 0.396 (0.0021) 1.154 (0.6728) 
Non profit 0.926 (0.4663) 1.022 (0.1261) 0.815 (0.7471) 0.923 (0.7207) 




Logistic modeling of key measurements indicates the influence of State (location) and 
ownership type for each facility.  Models were pared down to show variable factors with 
significant p values.  States with significance were placed in the comparison group, while the 
remaining states were arranged to create the reference group.  In Connecticut, short-stay patients 
with pressure ulcers observed a 30% increase in reduction of key measurements but the findings 
were not significant (OR=1.299, p=0.2891) (Table 13).  Long-stay physically restrained residents 
saw a 121% (2.2-fold) increase in reduction of key measurements and the findings were 
significant (OR=2.208, p=0.0003).   
Of the twenty-one states in the comparison group, eleven experienced an increase in the 
odds of reduction in percentage quality measures included in the study.  Five States observed 
increases in reduction of long-stay antipsychotic use with statistical significance.  Florida had a 
17% increase in the reduction of long-stay antipsychotics (p=0.0002), Louisiana a 36% increase 
in reduction (p=0.0003), New Jersey 62% increase in reduction (p=0.0001), New York 107% 
(2.1 fold) increase in reduction (p=0.0001), and Ohio a 34% increase in reduction (p=0.0001).  
Other States had an increase in the reduction of antipsychotic use, including Kentucky (23%) and 
Tennessee (28%), but neither were significant (p=0.0049 and 0.0014 respectively). 
Four states observed increases in reduction of long-stay moderate to severe pain with 
significant findings.  Florida had a 30% increase in the reduction of long-stay moderate to severe 
pain (p=0.0003), Louisiana 89% (p=0.0001), New York 79% (p=0.0001), and Oregon 29% 




Seven States, in addition to Connecticut, observed increases in the reduction of long-stay 
physical restraints with significant findings.  Florida had a 148% (2.4 fold) increase in the 
reduction of physical restraints (p=0.0001), Kentucky 83% (p=0.0001), Louisiana 138% (2.4 
fold, p=0.0001), Massachusetts 85% (p=0.0001), New Jersey 81% (p=0.0001), New York 85% 
(p=0.0001), and Tennessee 96% (p=0.0001).  None of the States observed an increase in the 
reduction of new or worsened short-stay pressure ulcers with significance. 
Table 15 provides data regarding states in the comparison group and higher/ lower odds 
ratios post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation for the four quality measures 
included in the study; percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic 
medication, percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain, long-stay 
residents who were physically restrained, and short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are 
new or worsened. 




















West 3.81 (1.31) 1 0 1 
Northeast 3.58 (1.33) 5 4 1 
Midwest 3.39 (1.38) 8 2 6 
South 3.19 (1.39) 7 5 2 





Logistic modeling of ownership observed significant findings in comparing for-profit, 
non profit, and government owned SNFs/ NFs.  Using for-profit facilities as the reference group, 
government owned facilities were 23% less likely than for-profit facilities to observe a decrease 
in the reduction of long-stay antipsychotic use (p=0.0001), 19% less likely to observe a decrease 
in long-stay moderate to severe pain (p=0.0002), and 39% less likely to observe a decrease in 
percentage of long-stay physical restraints (p=0.0001).  Government owned facilities were 7% 
less likely to observe a decrease in the percentage of short-stay pressure ulcers, though this was 
not statistically significant (p=0.491).  Non profit facilities were 7% less likely than for-profit 
facilities to experience a decrease in antipsychotic use, though not statistically significant 
(p=0.4663).  Non profit facilities were 18% less likely to experience a reduction in the 
percentage of physical restraints (p=0.7471) and 8% less likely to observe a reduction in short-
stay pressure ulcers (p=0.7207), though neither were statistically significant.  Non profit facilities 
had a 2% increase in the likelihood of reduction in the percentage of long-stay moderate to 












CHAPTER V DISCUSSION 
Long-term care has a lengthy history of stringent regulations developed in response to 
highly publicized poor outcomes (Eskildsen & Price, 2009).  Phase I of the Medicare and 
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities went into effect on 
November 27, 2016. According to Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017), the cost of 
implementing these rules is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000 
per year thereafter. However, it is not known if these costly new rules have any impact on quality 
measures.   
The purpose of this research project was to gain understanding of the impact of the 2016 
RoP (Phase I) on quality measures in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs).  
Results will enable providers to gain a better understanding of the impact of the RoP on four 
SNF/NF quality measures and provide policymakers with information regarding the impact of 
the RoP.  This chapter will discuss major findings of the study, relationship to literature, 
interpretation of results, recommendations for future research, study limitations, and a final 
summary. 
Research Question and Hypotheses  
How do CMS quality measures (QMs) compare pre- and post-implementation of Phase I of 
the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care 
Facilities? 
H1.  The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened 
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
      H2.  The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will 




H3.  The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline post-
implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will 
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation. 
The results of the study indicate three major findings, including 1) statistically significant 
reduction post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation (RoP) in the mean 
percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, the percentage 
of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain, the percentage of long-stay 
residents who were physically restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who received 
an antipsychotic medication; 2) the influence of ownership; and 3) the influence of location 
(State). 
Interpretation of the Results 
 The results of the study indicate statistically significant decreases in the mean percentage 
of each quality measure for fifteen of the sixteen quarter comparisons, 2015 to 2017.  Logistic 
models indicate the influence of ownership type (for-profit, non profit, and governments) and 
location (State) in predicting the odds of reduction in each quality measure variable percentage in 
2017 from 2015. 
Comparison of Means Pre- and Post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation 
Reductions in the mean percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new 
or worsened were observed post-implementation of the RoP (p=.0001) for three of the four 
comparisons.  While quarter one did not have a significant change in mean percentage when 
comparing 2015 and 2017 (p=0.96), quarters two through four indicate a significant decline in 




Reductions in the percentage of long-stay residents with antipsychotic use, physical 
restraints, and moderate to severe pain were observed for all quarters post-implementation of the 
RoP (p=.0001).    
There are several factors aside from the implementation of the RoP that may have 
impacted the improvements in quality measure outcomes when comparing 2015 and 2017.  The 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) was introduced by CMS in 2010 to reduce 
preventable readmissions to the hospital within 30 days of discharge (Zuckerman, Sheingold, 
Orav, Ruhter & Epstien, 2016).  The HRRP is part of the CMS value-based care initiative, which 
includes financial penalties to hospitals who do not meet the risk-adjusted national averages for 
readmissions (CMS, n.d.; McIlvennen et al, 2015).  The Protecting Medicare Act of 2014 
(PAMA) announced penalties to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) of up to 2% for Medicare Fee-
For-Service patients returning to the hospital within 30 days of discharge, effective in 2018 
(CMS, n.d.).  These programs have provided increased incentives to SNFs to improve quality 
outcomes.  Additionally, the growth of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and their 
requirements of participation (minimum of 3-star rating, staffing levels, utilization and numbers 
of physician extenders) have caused SNFs to improve their performance to stay competitive and 
ensure they are selected as preferred providers (Chang et al, 2019).   
Influence of Ownership 
The influence of ownership on nursing home quality has been well-studied (Hillmer, 
Wodchis, Gill, Anderson & Rochon, 2005; Qi, Luke, Crecelius & Maddox, 2019; Yuan, Louis, 
Cabral, Schneider, Ryan & Kazis, 2018).  The outcomes of this study indicate the influence of 
ownership status on reductions in the percentage of antipsychotic use, physical restraints, 




and government owned facilities had a lower likelihood of reduction in quality measure 
percentages in comparison to for-profit SNFs/NFs.  Prior studies indicate higher quality in non 
profit versus for-profit facilities (Qi et al, 2019; Yuan et al, 2018).  A study by Yuan et al (2018) 
indicates quality measures star rating of 3.54 (SD 1.33) in non profit facilities, 3.40 (1.38) in for-
profit, and 3.15 (1.48) for government owned facilities.  Hillmer et al (2005) conducted a 
systematic review of studies researching the correlation between ownership and quality in 
nursing facilities.  While most of the studies indicated non profit facilities experiencing better 
quality processes and outcomes, a few reported the opposite or no differences.  Additional 
considerations, such as acuity or case-mix and payer-mix may have an impact when considering 
ownership and quality measure outcomes. 
Influence of State/ Location 
Robust literature exists regarding the influence of state (location) on SNF/ NF quality 
measure outcomes. As mentioned in Chapter II, Mukamel et al (2011) references the variances in 
quality measures amongst states due to the acuity of nursing home residents and the impact on 
the measurement of quality and regulatory compliance.  Yuan et al (2018) report average quality 
measure star ratings of 3.58 (SD 1.33) in the Northeast, 3.39 (1.38) in the Midwest, 3.19 (1.39) 
in the South, and 3.81 (1.31) in the West.  Variances amongst states were evident for the four 
quality measures included in this study, as reported in Table 14. 
As described in the literature, there are several factors influencing quality measure outcomes.  
Studies have found that pressure ulcers reflect staffing levels and competency of staff, both 
impacted by payer-mix and state Medicaid funding (Blankart, Foster & Mor, 2019; Grabowski et 
al, 2008; Gruneir & Mor, 2008).  Grabowski et al (2008) found a direct relationship between 




sources such as Medicare and private funding, and lower indicators of quality for Medicaid.  
Levenson (2010) underscores the importance of considering acuity, needs, and preferences of the 
resident in setting reimbursement.   
Additional factors having an impact on the variances in quality measure outcomes between 
states include minimum staffing requirements (Bowblis, 2015), regulatory stringency at the state 
and local levels, and levels of competition and transparency (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Mukamel 
et al, 2012).  Lastly, demographic factors, such as income and education levels, unemployment 
rates, and poverty levels have proven to be a factor in quality measure differences amongst states 
(Yuan et al, 2018).   
Study Limitations 
While this study adds important and timely information to the existing knowledge base 
surrounding the effects of regulatory stringency on quality measures in Skilled Nursing Facilities 
(SNFs)/ Nursing Facilities (NFs), there are several limitations to be considered.  Key study 
limitations include 1) the use of Minimum Data Set (MDS) Data; 2) Patient Characteristics and 
Demographic Information; 3) External and Internal Factors.  
Use of Minimum Data Set (MDS) 
Given the limited sources of data pertaining to nursing homes, this study utilized Nursing 
Home Compare Minimum Data Set (MDS) collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services to conduct a retrospective program evaluation.  The Minimum Data Set (MDS) was 
introduced in 1991, requiring skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs) to assess 
resident’s health status and capabilities in performing activities of daily living (ADLs) (Castle & 
Ferguson, 2010).  The MDS information is also used to determine reimbursement, focus of 




Applebaum, 2009).  While the reliability and validity of earlier versions of the MDS was 
disputed, the implementation of MDS 3.0 in October 2010 brought greater validity and inter-
rater reliability by standardizing the tool and providing means to engage the resident in the 
assessment process. 
The aspects and consequences of coding the MDS are abundant and can provide 
motivation to manipulate responses to increase reimbursement, improve survey outcomes, and/or 
improve public perception of the facilities performance.  Reliability and validity depend on 
several factors, including the experience and training of the licensed nurse(s) completing the 
MDS, and the engagement of the resident and interdisciplinary team in the process (Saliba & 
Buchanan, 2012).   A report by the Government Accountability Office (2018) indicated 
inaccuracies in self-reported data, including short-stay pressure ulcers, long-stay antipsychotic 
use, physical restraints, and moderate to severe pain.  While a reduction in each of these 
measures was observed between 2011 and 2014, the report indicated it could not attribute the 
improvements to quality versus difficult to determine whether observed trends reflect actual 
changes in quality, data issues, or both. The report indicates a lack of systematic approach to 
monitor the accuracy of the data. While data is validated by surveyors during compliance and 
regulatory visits, there is potential for inaccuracy as only a small selection of reviews are 
conducted. 
Additional limitations to the use of the MDS data included the inability to obtain data by 
calendar year hence the need to compare quarter to quarter 2015 and 2017 for each of the four 
quality measures. The datasets were difficult to employ, and data was non-normally distributed 
with wide variances.  Due to these challenges, logistic modeling was confined to one quarter 




Patient Characteristics and Demographic Factors 
This study did not incorporate several demographics such as age, acuity, and payer mix, 
all of which have been identified as having an impact on facility quality measures through a 
variety of evidenced-based studies (Change et al, 2016; Hillmer et al, 2005; Mays et al, 2018). 
The literature indicates the effects of payer mix on quality improvement and outcomes in SNFs/ 
NFs (Bowblis, 2015; Levenson, 2010).  The inability to include patient characteristics and 
demographic factors may present limitations to the generalizability of the results and may have 
influenced the results of the study.  Controlling for these factors and comparing data at the 
resident level may reveal varying results regardless of location or ownership type (Levenson, 
2010).   
External Factors 
As mentioned earlier, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), the 
Protecting Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA), and the growth of Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs) may have impacted the desirable reduction in percentages of short-stay pressure ulcers 
that are new or worsened, long-stay physical restraints, antipsychotic use, and moderate to severe 
pain.  Financial incentives for improved performance suggest the development of strategies and 
new approaches to care by SNFs/NFs to meet the criteria and ensure penalties are not appointed.  
These penalties can have devastating consequences for facilities who are already underfunded by 
Medicaid (AHCA, 2017; Siegel et al, 2014).  
Additional external factors that may influence quality measure outcomes include 
participation in QIN-QIO initiatives, state or national quality award programs, incentives at the 
national, state, or local level by payer sources or regulatory agencies, changes in reimbursement 





There are several internal factors that may impact the changes in quality measure outcomes 
providing additional study limitations.  This study did not include factors such as changes in 
leadership of individual SNFs/ NFs between 2015 and 2017, the leadership styles, education and/ 
or experience of facility leaders (including the Administrator and Director of Nursing), or 
changes in ownership.  Performance based compensation or incentives, availability of resources 
or consultants, staffing levels, experience and qualifications of management and direct care staff, 
and numbers of ancillary staff members may impact quality measure outcomes. 
Policy and Research Implications  
This study was the first to consider the impact of Requirements of Participation (RoP) Phase 
I on four skilled nursing facility (SNF)/(NF) quality measures.  The RoP was the first overhaul of 
nursing home regulations in almost thirty years.  Prior regulatory updates were made prior to 
implementation of the quality measures, providing little opportunity for quantitative 
measurement of potential impact of the changes on quality in SNFs/NFs.  This study has added 
to existing knowledge by providing quantitative data regarding the impact of regulatory 
stringency on four SNF/NF quality measures.   
Previous literature has provided mixed results regarding the impact of regulatory stringency 
on quality in nursing homes.  While the results of this study indicates a significant and positive 
change in quality measure outcomes relating to the percentage of antipsychotic use, physical 
restraints, moderate to severe pain, and pressure ulcers for nursing home residents, it also 
suggests the influence of ownership and location (state) on the quality measures for Skilled 
Nursing Facilities/ Nursing Facilities.  More research is needed to explore these influences in 




robust study inclusive of all quality measures is recommended, using annual data for 
comparison.  Consideration of staffing levels, payer mix, acuity, and retention and turnover of 
key staff, including facility leadership (Administrator and Director of Nursing) is recommended.  
Retention, turnover, training, and experience of facility staff completing the MDS should also be 
considered as a means of comparison. 
There are several policy implications for the results of this study.  In the past, policy makers 
have looked to regulatory stringency to ‘fix’ quality problems in SNFs/NFs.  Given the costs of 
compliance for SNFs/NFs, and the resources necessary for oversight of regulatory compliance 
and enforcement, consideration of quantitative methods to determine effectiveness are 
paramount.  It also provides an opportunity for policy makers to question the variances amongst 
states and providers; are those responsible for ensuring compliance applying the regulations 
consistently?  Is the level of oversight appropriate?  Policy makers should also consider 
opportunities to improve the reliability and validity of the MDS data used to establish the quality 
measures.  Without accurate data, it is impossible to determine the impact of regulatory 
stringency on quality outcomes. 
Lastly, policy makers should consider therapeutic jurisprudence in lawmaking and oversight 
of SNFs/NFs (Kapp, 2000).  Feedback from stakeholders, including residents, is imperative to 
quality of life and quality of care for those residing in nursing homes.  Factoring resident 
satisfaction and quality of life when considering the impact of regulatory stringency, as they are 
the most important declaration of all.  
Conclusion 
 Long-term care is one of the most highly regulated industries in the U.S.  On November 




term care facilities was implemented by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  
Given the scant research on the effectiveness of regulatory stringency on improving quality in 
nursing homes, the hefty costs and a lack of potential increases in funding at the state or federal 
levels, the potential effects of the RoP were questionable.   
 A review of the literature resulted in few evidence-based studies conducted apropos the 
implementation nursing home quality measures.  The RoP of 2016 was the first major overhaul 
of SNF/NF regulations since 1991. Quality measures were not implemented until 2002, therefore 
opportunities to conduct quantitative studies pre- and post-implementation of regulatory 
requirements have been limited.  Studies included in the literature review found inconsistencies 
in regulatory compliance and enforcement amongst surveyors (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; 
Winzelberg, 2003), differing philosophies in regulation and control of markets (Mukamel et al, 
2011).  Reimbursement, patient acuity, payer mix, staffing levels, and competency of staff were 
identified as additional factors impacting quality measures and regulatory compliance in nursing 
homes (Blankart, Foster & Mor, 2019; Grabowski et al, 2008, Gruneir & Mor, 2008). 
 The results of this study indicate a significant decrease in the mean percentage of long-
stay residents with antipsychotic use, long-stay physical restraints, and long-stay moderate to 
severe pain when comparing quarters one through four pre-(2015) and post-implementation 
(2017) of the RoP.  The percentage of short-stay residents with new or worsening pressure ulcers 
observed a significant decrease in mean for quarters two through four when comparing 2015 and 
2017.  Logistic models indicate the influence of ownership and location (state) on quality 
measure odds ratios.  That said, there are several additional factors that must be considered to 




results.  Regardless, the results provide invaluable, preliminary information for policy makers 
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